Administrative Process in an Information Age: The Transformation of Agency Action under the Data Quality Act by Hecht, Alexander Nathan
Journal of Legislation
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 1
5-1-2005
Administrative Process in an Information Age: The
Transformation of Agency Action under the Data
Quality Act
Alexander Nathan Hecht
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hecht, Alexander Nathan (2005) "Administrative Process in an Information Age: The Transformation of Agency Action under the
Data Quality Act," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol31/iss2/1
ARTICLES
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN AN INFORMATION
AGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGENCY
ACTION UNDER THE DATA QUALITY ACT
Alexander Nathan Hecht*
I. INTRODUCTION
When originally enacted on December 21, 2000, as a two-paragraph rider to a
Department of Treasury appropriations bill-without any congressional hearings or
explanatory legislative history-the Data Quality Act ("DQA")1 appeared innocent and
innocuous enough. Ostensibly, it intends to improve the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information that federal agencies disseminate to the public. The DQA
requires that agencies ensure the quality of information and data that underlies
administrative actions-including proposed new rules and regulations, published
studies, and guidance documents.
2
Since the end of the nineteenth century, administrative agencies have played an
"increasingly important role in the legal regulation of economic and social activity."
3
Agencies promote the public health, safety, and welfare, provide a more workable
framework for government action than a cumbersome legal process, bear a technical
expertise in specific areas they seek to regulate, and are more conducive to bureaucratic
and scientific neutrality than other social institutions.4 While agencies often regulate by
formal and informal rulemakings, these procedures have become so time consuming
and costly that the process has become "ossified."5 In this Internet age, agencies now
* J.D.; LL.M., The George Washington University School of Law. The author is Regulatory Counsel for the
United States Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship and is Adjunct Assistant Professor of
Health Policy at The George Washington University School of Public Health. This article was originally
written as the author's LL.M. thesis at The George Washington School of Law. The author thanks his thesis
advisor, Sara Rosenbaum, J.D., Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor of Health Care Law & Policy, for her
invaluable support and direction. Finally, the author dedicates this article to the memory of Shira Arielle
Kansas, M.D., whose spirit continues to burn brightly and inspire.
1. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 (2001). The Data Quality Act is often referred to as the "Information Quality
Act."
2. Id.
3. Richard E. Levy & Sydney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 473,473 (2003).
4. Id. at 476.
5. Id. at 489 (citation omitted); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (contending that "it is much harder for an agency to
promulgate a rule now.... Agency explanations for rules are far more lengthy and intricate than they were in
the 1960s and early 1970s.").
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disseminate information through an expansive electronic network.6 The range of this
information dissemination is staggering, and includes guidance documents, advisory
opinions, scientific reports, and compliance assistance. Despite this rapid expansion,
there has existed no legal mechanism for challenging the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of the information that agencies disseminate.
Touted as the most significant change to the federal rulemaking process since the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")7 in 1946,8 the DQA provides
an unprecedented channel through which both individual citizens and industries may
challenge types of agency action that had long been immune from legal scrutiny.
Unlike the typical APA challenge, which centers on whether an agency has abused its
discretion or acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 9 the DQA permits affected
parties to contest the underlying data and information used to formulate governmental
regulations, rather than merely challenging a rule during the rulemaking process or
waiting until an agency takes final action to file an expensive lawsuit. 10 The DQA's
relatively straightforward administrative mechanism should enable cost-efficient
challenges that will permit the agencies to take the first bite at a correction, rather than
being compelled to do so through litigation or court order.
Simply stated, the DQA intends to improve the quality of federal rulemaking and
the information upon which agencies base their decision-making and actions. By
limiting administrative action to circumstances that can be supported by underlying data
and information, agencies will in theory only act in limited, necessary, and justified
circumstances. By requiring heightened transparency in agency actions, the DQA
purports to "counter the ability of particular interest groups to capture the agenda of the
agencies.,, I
However, in the initial years following the DQA's enactment, quite the contrary
has occurred. For industry, the DQA represents yet another weapon capable of delaying
or derailing agency action. The focus of industry has been anything but altruistic. In
2000, the cost to the national economy of complying with federal rules rose to $843
billion, or eight percent of the gross domestic product. 12 Following an administration
that favors corporate concerns over the common man and fits science to political
ideology, 13 industry has so far used the DQA to challenge the scientific assertions made
6. See generally Paul Noe et al., Learning to Live with the Data Quality Act, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10224
(2003).
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2003).
8. See James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act: Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions?, 12 KAN J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 521 (2003) (arguing that the DQA is the most significant
conceptual advance in administrative law in the last three decades); Maureen Lorenzetti, Watching
Government: Data Quality, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 7, 2002, at 31.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2003).
10. Stephanie M. Horvath, Law to Let Businesses Attack Data Underlying Rules, Studies, WALL ST. J.,
July 5, 2002, at A4.
11. Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10225 (arguing that the DQA could have the unintended impact of
increasing governmental accountability to the public).
12. Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014,
15,040 n.28 (Mar. 28, 2002).
13. See generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10125 (2001) (asserting that the role of science is being increasingly marginalized and is
playing less of a role in the decision-making process); David Kohn, Government Bends, Hides Facts, Say
Scientists: 60 Leading Researchers, Including Nobelists, Detail Suppression Under Bush, BALT. SUN, Feb.
[Vol. 31:2
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by agencies-regardless of whether such assertions are controversial or non-
controversial.
More importantly, the DQA is the latest signpost in a purported trend towards
transparency in the federal regulatory process. With roots buried deeply in the
economic analysis of law movement, the DQA is the latest in a long string of
governmental action-including executive orders, statutory authority, and proposed
federal legislation-that requires an objective and empirical justification prior to
engaging in regulatory action. Because it requires a showing of the precise, quantifiable
information that underlies an agency's action, the DQA pushes the American legal
system further away from the "Precautionary Principle,"'14 the framework for regulation
that is favored in Europe. By disallowing regulation in the face of scientific
uncertainty, the DQA pushes the United States further down a path that favors pro-
business, laissez faire regulation at the expense of protecting the health, safety, and
well-being of the general public.
In its first year since implementation, federal agencies have denied most industry
challenges, citing valid existing procedural and information safeguards that pre-date the
DQA. The routine denial of these requests may open a floodgate of litigation
unintended by the DQA. However, the quick action of agencies to assert the soundness
of their information quality procedures raises another, more daunting problem: federal
agencies may not be fulfilling their mandates under the DQA, and information in the
DQA age has not improved at all.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the role of agencies in the American system
of government as well as constitutional and statutory limitations on administrative
action. Part III introduces the basic precepts of economic analysis of law and traces
how these precepts have been repeatedly manifested, in increasing frequency, in
executive and congressional actions. Part IV details the background of the DQA and
discusses key definitions, phrases, and requirements. Part V surveys various DQA
concerns and predictions tendered by competing interest groups, from individuals to
industry to public interest entities. Part VI considers the premise of the DQA as
"Regulatory Daubert," drawing an analogy between enactment of the DQA and the
evolvement of the law of evidence. Finally, Part VII assesses what has transpired at the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") since the DQA's enactment, surveying a
number of DQA petitions and lawsuits and how the EPA has disposed of them.
II. THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT
The role of administrative agencies in the American system of government has
grown dramatically since 1887, when Congress established the first agency, the
19, 2004, at IA (reporting that over sixty scientists, including twenty Nobel laureates, have charged the Bush
administration of manipulating scientific knowledge that conflicts with political goals).
14. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Mar. 22, 2002, at 90 [hereinafter "NAS WORKSHOP #2"] (stating that the
precautionary principle envisions that in instances when not all information is known, regulators should err on
the side of enacting extra protections).
2005]
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Interstate Commerce Commission, to regulate railroads. 15 Administrative agencies rose
to prominence during the New Deal in the 1930s, a period marked by a governmental
commitment to "act positively, to itself identify and solve economic and social
problems as opposed to leaving these matters to a free market and private solutions."
' 16
In the 1960s, the number and scope of federal regulatory agencies greatly expanded,
covering, inter alia, the regulation of oil prices, energy production, environmental
pollution, workplace safety, and consumer protection. 17 In 1999, there existed 143
federal agencies that employed 3.1 million civilians.
18
Administrative agencies play a wide variety of roles in American society.
Agencies are "the authorities and operating units of the government except for
constitutionally established entities.' ' 19 Agencies implement various social, economic,
and quality of life programs. They regulate business, preventing corporations from
achieving monopolies over private markets, and emergent industries, helping to set
guidelines and a framework for new technology. 2 1 They conduct regulatory programs
that increase public awareness about potential risks to human health, and then
promulgate rules or issue guidance documents that detail how to avoid said risks.
Agencies tailor their regulatory techniques to meet individual problems and
circumstances. 22  They often require licensure and certification prior to undertaking
specific activities, establish standards and guidelines that govern conduct, adjudicate
violations and impose penalties, and potentially influence public conduct through a
wide variety of informal information dissemination.
23
A comprehensive discussion of the limitations on agency action and rulemaking is
more properly the subject of a law school course on administrative law. For purposes of
this Article, however, it is important to note that both constitutional principles and
statutory authority limit the conduct of agencies. As interpreted by substantial case law,
the United States Constitution addresses the degree to which Congress may delegate
power and responsibility to executive agencies. 24  In addition, agencies may not
impermissibly intrude on the province of the legislative and judicial branches of
government, 25 must adhere to substantive due process clause concerns when conducting
15. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982).
16. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 1 (4th ed. 1997)
(stating that the economic depression of the 1930s was followed by a proliferation of agencies during the New
Deal that aimed to "stabilize the economy, temper the exercise of unregulated markets, and provide some
financial security for individuals").
17. BREYER, supra note 15, at 1 (contending that from 1936 to 1977, the number of pages of Federal
Regulations in the Federal Register grew from 2,599 to 65,603, and that permanent full-time positions in
regulatory agencies grew from 28,000 in 1970 to 81,000 in 1979).
18. Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 941, 960 (1999).
19. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASE AND COMMENTS 8
(2003).
20. ALFRED C. AMAN & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (1993).
21. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 16, at 1.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id.
24. See generally STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 66-83 (discussing the history of the delegation
doctrine from the late 1800s to the present).
25. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a one-house legislative veto was
unconstitutional); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that a balanced budget statute contained an
[Vol. 31:2
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adjudications, 26 and offer procedural due process when an agency may injure a
protected interest through an informal action, benefits determination, or rulemaking.
27
The APA provides the general statutory framework for agencies to conduct both
formal and informal rulemakings. The APA's more typical, informal "notice and
comment" rulemaking involves four steps: (1) publication of the proposed rule in the
Federal Register; (2) receipt of written and oral comments from the public; (3) possible
modification or alteration of the rule in response to the comments; and (4) publication
of the final rule with a statement of purpose. 28 In more limited circumstances, agencies
may also conduct "formal" rulemaking, a process which generally requires a formal
hearing in which parties provide testimony, present evidence taken on the record, and
cross-examine adverse witnesses.
29
As a threshold matter, the APA governs agency rulemaking procedures. While the
APA contains no provisions specifically addressing information quality, it does
prohibit, in formal rulemakings and adjudications, ex parte communications between
agency employees and interested persons outside the agency.3 1 The APA prohibits
agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" 3 2 and allows for judicial review of final agency actions.33 The
APA's judicial review provision allows a party to sue an agency for making a policy
decision with no rational basis or for exercising a bias in its actions. 34 However, it does
not provide the specific means, like the DQA, for challenging the information that
underlies agency action.
III. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS/INFORMATION QUALITY
A. General Background
Brought into mainstream legal academia in the 1970s, 35 economic analysis of law
applies microeconomic theories to the analysis of legal rules and institutions.
36
unconstitutional assignment of executive functions to an agent of the legislative branch).
26. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (holding that "the right to a hearing
embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them").
27. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (2003). See also Richard A. Greene, Recent Developments in Federal
Regulatory Policy, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 607, 609 (2002).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)-(e) (2003).
30. See Conrad, supra note 8, at 532-33 (arguing that the APA is ill-suited to address the risks posed by
information activities and has not provided effective judicial review of free-standing information
disseminations).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2003).
32. Id. § 706(2)(A).
33. Id. § 702.
34. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 642 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing that judicial
review under the APA arises from a desire to control agency bias).
35. See generally id.
36. Economic Analysis of Law, STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Economic
2005]
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Economic analysis of law attempts to explain rules as they are, rather than trying to
change them solely for the sake of improvement.37  While the movement itself is
difficult to briefly and accurately encapsulate, the key principles include: (1) legal rules
should be efficient; (2) legal processes generally gravitate to efficient rules; and (3)
individuals respond to legal rules economically.
3 8
Economic analysis of law is primarily concerned with "using economic methods as
theoretical constructs for analyzing, in economic terms, the rules and laws adopted by a
particular society." 39 As Malloy notes, "[B]y subjecting legal doctrine to economic cost
and benefit analysis and to concepts of economic efficiency, [economic analysis of law]
can allow us to draw certain conclusions about the consequences and alleged social
value of particular legal arrangements." 40 From a public policy perspective, economic
analysis of law focuses both on the effects of legal rules on private individuals and on
"political economy," the interplay between the operation of political institutions, such
as courts, legislatures, and executive and administrative agencies.
4 1
Economic analysis of law is typically associated with a conservative ideology
towards government and society. Conservatives use economic analysis of law to
support their arguments about the deleterious effects and undue burdens that excessive
regulations will bear on small businesses and private citizens. Typical conservative
arguments promote the adoption of market-based trading systems and maintain that the
free market is best suited to handle regulatory issues on its own, without government
intervention. Such intervention is presumptively inappropriate, especially when
scientific data is unsound or in the face of informational or scientific uncertainty.
Conservatives also advocate for: (1) "sound science" as a precursor for valid risk
assessment, (2) the use of cost-benefit analysis to shape environmental programs, and
(3) maintaining a minimum quality of data to support regulatory decisions.
42
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Principal Tool of Economic Analysis
Since the 1930s, the principal tool of economic analysis used to evaluate public
expenditure decisions has been cost-benefit analysis ("CBA"), 43 a process that requires
Analysis]. This paper differentiates between economic analysis of law and law and economics, the latter of
which is commonly described as a broader, comparative analysis between economic, philosophical, political,
and legal institutions. See also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIvE APPROACH
TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1990).
37. POSNER, supra note 34, at 25.
38. Economic Analysis, supra note 36.
39. MALLOY, supra note 36, at 3.
40. Id.
41. Economic Analysis, supra note 36.
42. Rena I. Steinzor, Toward Better Bubbles and Future Lives: A Progressive Response to the
Conservative Agenda for Reforming Environmental Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11421, 11423 (2002). In
contrast, a progressive regulatory agenda maintains that, "the public's health-regardless of class, race,
ethnicity, gender, or age-must be protected from the consequences of industrial and agricultural activity."
Id. Government, and not private business, is best suited to protect the "birth rights" protected by regulatory
structures, including a clean environment and public health. Id. Finally, progressives believe in the
precautionary principle, which maintains that regulatory action is appropriate-and even necessary-in
situations when uncertainty surrounds a risk. Id.
43. EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134 (1978) (arguing that
governmental use of CBA arose in the 1930s with the analysis of water resource projects and has increased in
[Vol. 31:2
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"systematic enumeration of all benefits and all costs, tangible and intangible, whether
readily quantifiable or difficult to measure, that will accrue to all members of society if
a particular project is adopted." 44 CBA is useful for determining whether a proposed
course of action is efficient compared to alternative courses of action.
45
CBA typically incorporates a description of the total outcomes of various projects
and provides a rule for choosing among them.46 One common procedure for a CBA
includes:
(1) The project or projects to be analyzed are identified.
(2) All the impacts, both favorable and unfavorable, present and future, on all of
society are determined.
(3) Values, usually in dollars, are assigned to these impacts. Favorable impacts will
be registered as benefits, unfavorable ones as costs.
(4) The net benefit (total benefit minus total cost) is calculated.
(5) The choice is made.
4 7
CBA may be either "monetized," which reduces each cost and benefit of a regulatory
proposal to a dollar figure and then calculates a monetary cost or benefit for the
use since World War II). This paper focuses on cost-benefit analysis. Other tools of economic analysis
include regulatory scorecards, see Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345,
1345 (2003) (stating the regulatory scorecards are "scathing critiques of government ... which purport to
show that the costs of many government regulations vastly outweigh their benefits"), discount rates, see
POSNER, supra note 34, at 398-99 (defining the discount rate as the rate to be used to discount the future
benefits to a present value cost that may be compared to a present actual cost), Office of Management &
Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, at 31-38 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
htpp://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) [hereinafter OMB Circular
A-4] (arguing that agencies should use discount rates when benefits or costs are delayed or otherwise
separated in time from each other), and qualified adjusted life years ("QALYs"), see James K. Hammitt,
Valuing Health: Quality-Adjusted Life Years or Willingness to Pay?, 11 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE: HARVARD
CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS 1 (2003) (defining QALYs as useful for measuring an individual's future
longevity and the quality of the individual's health during that time).
44. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 43, at 134.
45. Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Judicial Review, II DUKE ENV. L. & POL'Y F. 89, 91-92 (2000) (listing the costs of a regulatory action as
the time, labor, material, and capital expended, and the benefits as the gains in utility to the beneficiary
population). CBA has been defined as "a method of pure evaluation, conducted without regard to the possible
use of its results in a decision; to an input into decision, with the decision maker free to reject the results of the
analysis on the basis of other considerations; or to the exclusive method of decision." POSNER, supra note 34,
at 397.
46. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 43, at 134.
47. Id. at 136.
20051
Journal of Legislation
proposal, or "non-monetized," which relies on intuition and judgment rather than formal
commensuration to balance varying costs and benefits.
48
Critics of economic analysis argue that tools like CBA may contribute to a
"paralysis by analysis" of government agencies, in that excessive CBA may drain
agency resources and slow down the rulemaking process. 49 CBA may also engender a
potential bias against protective legislation. Finally, not all benefits and costs may be
easily "monetized" or translated into numerical terms for purposes of cost-benefit
analysis.
50
It goes without saying that for economic analysis to have any credence, the
underlying assumptions and data that comprise the economic calculations must be
accurate and reliable. For the economic analysis of law movement to become deeply
and permanently entrenched in the American system of government, it must be able to
counter claims that CBA and other tools fail to accurately represent real world concerns.
Therein lies the power and the importance of the DQA to the economic analysis of
law movement. By requiring the use of only proven and widely accepted data and
information, proponents of economic analysis may dismiss criticisms that CBA is ill-
suited to work in the real world-all the while quashing potential administrative actions
before they even arise.
C. Government Use of Economic Analysis and Data Quality
1. The Rise of OMB and OIRA
Since the Nixon Administration, American presidents, through a centralized
mechanism for agency oversight, have vowed to rein in the expanding realm of federal
regulations. 51 Created in 1970, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")
prepares the President's annual budget proposal to Congress, assists in the management
of the executive branch, and conducts in-depth regulatory review of significant rules
proposed by federal agencies. 52 OMB reviews the actions of over 100 other agencies,
boards, and commissions. 53 According to one commentator:
48. Matthew D. Adler, Risk Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1293, 1394 (2003). In instances when costs and benefits may not be easily monetized, agencies may
employ cost effectiveness analysis. OMB Circular A-4, supra note 43, at 11. This tool of economic analysis
is "designed to compare a set of regulatory actions with the same primary outcome ... or multiple outcomes
that can be integrated into a single numerical index." Id.
49. David C. Vladeck, Paralysis by Analysis: How Conservatives Plan to Kill Popular Legislation, AM.
PROSPECT (1995), available at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?Section+root&name=ViewPrint
&articlelD=5010 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
50. Steinzor, supra note 42, 11423 (stating that, for the following reasons, risk assessment based on CBA
is an inexact science: "The fatal mistake is to step across the line between asking decisionmakers to weigh
those factors and requiring them to achieve the bogus goal of ensuring that benefits, to the dollar, always
outweigh costs, with this artificial equation the sum total of what determines the final decision.").
51. Jim Ostroff, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is Emerging from Obscurity as a Rule
Reviewer, to the Benefit of Small Businesses, KIPLINGER BUS. FORECASTS, Apr. 1, 2002.
52. See Office of Management & Budget, OMB in Perspective, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/





OMB stands at a critical point within the nerve center of the federal government and
holds a key position in the communication network that links the President, the rest
of the Executive Branch, and the Congress. So positioned, it can exert a significant
impact on public policy outcomes through its budgetary, legislative, managerial, and
regulation review mandates.
54
Regulatory reform of OMB's role as reviewer of regulations-with an increasing
emphasis on economic analysis and information quality-has been a governmental
focus for the past three decades. In 1974, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order
11,821, 55 which provided that "[m]ajor proposals . . . for the promulgation of
regulations or rules by any executive branch agency must be accompanied by a
statement which certifies that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been
evaluated."56 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12,044, entitled
"Improving Government Regulations," which adopted a number of the principles of
economic analysis. 57 It directed federal agencies to ensure that: (1) the need for and
purposes of a proposed regulation were clearly established; (2) meaningful alternatives
were considered and analyzed before a final regulation was issued; and (3) regulatory
analysis was conducted on significant regulations having major economic consequences
to the national economy.
58
Regulatory reform of OMB's role and responsibilities continued into the 1980s,
when environmentalists called for reform of the agency.59 Established in 1980 under
the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA"), a division of OMB, carries the lead role in executive oversight. O1RA is a
little-known, behind-the-scenes agency that wields considerable regulatory power.
OIRA acts as an administrative gatekeeper, with the power to review and block certain
regulations. Staffed by career civil servants, OIRA develops and oversees the
implementation of government-wide policies in the areas of information technology and
policy, privacy, and statistical policy.
6 1
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,62 which required
that most regulations issued by federal agencies satisfy a CBA, and that the agencies
must submit a Regulatory Impact Analysis of "major rules" which would have an
54. Id. (quoting SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL
BUDGET OFFICE xi (1998)).
55. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974).
56. Id. (providing that the OMB Director must consider the following factors in the evaluation of
proposed agency action: the cost impact on consumers, businesses, markets, or government entities; the effect
on productivity of wage earners, businesses, or government; the effect on government; and the effect on
supplies of important products or services). Two years later, President Ford retitled Executive Order 11,821
to become "Economic Impact Statements." Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017 (Dec. 31, 1976).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978).
58. Id.
59. Ostroff, supra note 51 (citing a 1984 article in the Virginia Journal of Natural Resources, in which
the author, now an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, asserted that "if regulatory review is
to increase bureaucratic accountability and provide more reasoned decision making, the courts and Congress
must act" to change OMB's methods of operation).
60. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2000).
61. See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OIRA Q&A 's, at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/omb/inforeg/qa_2-25-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
62. Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
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annual impact of $100 million or more on the national economy.63 Under Executive
Order 12,291, federal agencies had to provide OMB with a description of the potential
costs and benefits of a rule, including those that may not be quantified in monetary
terms.64  They were also required to provide a description of alternatives to the
proposed rulemaking and include legal explanations of why such alternatives were not
taken. 65 In keeping with the conservative trend towards economic analysis, Executive
Order 12,291 required that agencies identify market failures prior to considering
regulatory action.
66
In 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498,67 which required
agencies to submit to OMB a statement of their regulatory policies, goals, and
objectives for each year,68 and to ensure that such plans were consistent with the goals
of the agency and of the Administration, including the Administration's regulatory
principles.
69
In September 1993, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866,70
"Regulatory Planning and Review," which revoked both Executive Order 12,291 and
12,498, but retained many elements of economic analysis. In particular Executive
Order 12,866 requires that:
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by law...
or are made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of private
markets to protect or improve the health or safety of the public, the environment, or
the well-being of the American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate,
agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,
including the alternative of not regulating.
7 1
For "significant" regulatory actions, 72 Executive Order 12,866 requires that
agencies submit to OIRA an assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the
regulatory action 73 and an assessment of potentially effective and reasonable
alternatives to the proposed regulation.74 OIRA typically has ninety calendar days to
review submitted rules and to ensure that they are consistent with applicable law, and
the President's priorities, and do not conflict with the actions of other agencies.
75
63. Id. § 3(c)(2).
64. Id. § 3(d)(1)-(3).
65. Id. § 3(d)(4).
66. Susan E. Dudley, Bush's Rejuvenated OIRA, 24 REGULATION 5 (2001), available at
http://www.regulationmagazine.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n4/mercatusreports.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2005).
67. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (Jan. 4, 1985).
68. Id. § 1(a).
69. Id. § 3(a).
70. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
71. Id. § 1(a).
72. Id. § 3(f(1).-(3) (defining significant regulatory actions as those that have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or that create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action
taken or planned by another agency).
73. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii).
74. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii).
75. Id. § 6(b)(2)(B).
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Executive Order 12,866 also addresses transparency in the regulatory process and
information quality. For example, the order imposes strict public disclosure
requirements of communications between OIRA employees and outside parties made
during a regulatory review.76  In addition, Executive Order 12,866 requires that
agencies, after OIRA completes its review, (1) identify for the public, in a complete,
clear, and simple manner, the substantive changes between the draft submitted to OIRA
for review and the action subsequently announced, and (2) identify for the public those
changes in the regulatory action that were made at the suggestion or recommendation of
OIRA. 
77
Under President Clinton, OIRA's role was considerably more dormant, with
regulatory review giving a wide berth to agency discretion. However, under President
George W. Bush, OIRA has regained a quiet power, asserting a role similar to that
under the Nixon and Reagan Administrations. This has coincided with President
Bush's appointment of John Graham to head OIRA, a nomination that received
relatively little media coverage or political controversy-but one which has bome far-
reaching effects on federal regulatory policy.
Graham founded and directed the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, which was
launched with a mission of promoting reasoned public responses to health, safety, and
environmental hazards by taking a broad view of public health.78 A controversial but
avowed devotee of cost-benefit analysis, 79 Graham strongly believes in methods of
empirically evaluating regulatory efficacy. 80 He also adheres to the concept of quality-
adjusted life years ("QALYs") saved, an approach that objectively values the quality of
life experienced by the individual who is exposed to the risk.
81
Once empowered at OIRA, Graham announced a "science-based" overhaul of the
federal regulatory process. 82 In September 2001, Graham announced that OIRA would
work with the agencies to again enforce Executive Order 12,866. 83  OMB would
employ "a host of requirements and guidelines," including peer review, risk
assessments, and risk impact analyses, to review proposed federal regulations.
84
76. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(A)-(D).
77. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii).
78. Ellen Nakashima, For Bush's Regulatory Czar, The Equation is Persuasion; Graham Wields Cost-
Benefit Analysis For, Against Rules, WASH. POST, May 10, 2002, at A35. See also Riskworld, at
www.riskworld.com (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
79. Id. (describing Graham's approach as "regulations czar" as being deeply grounded in the balancing of
costs and benefits, and risks and rewards).
80. See Randall Lutter, The Role of Economic Analysis in Regulatory Reform, 22 REGULATION 38, 40
(1999), available at www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n2/econanalysis.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005)
(contending that "[b]enefit cost analysis can help to inform Congress and the public about the economic
merits and effects of congressional mandates and agencies' actions").
81. See Steinzor, supra note 42, at 11423 (arguing that QALYs "empower bureaucrats to engage in an
elaborate, pseudo-scientific triage of various sub-populations").
82. Ellen Nakashima, Chief Plans Overhaul of Regulatory Process, Report: "Science-Based'" Approach
Sought, WASH. POST, March 20, 2002, at A31.
83. Memorandum from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to President's Management Council
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira-review-process.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005).
84. OMB to Use "Science-Based" Guidelines in Rule Review, AM. POL. NETWORK: AM. HEALTH LINE,
Sept. 26, 2001, at 5.
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Graham stated that OIRA would reject proposed regulations that "lack an adequate cost
benefit analysis and reasonable alternatives."
85
The results have been significant. In Graham's first two years as OIRA Director,
OIRA used Executive Order 12,866 to return sixteen rules to agencies for
reconsideration, compared to nine rules returned during the first eight years of the
executive order.86  In September 2003, OMB released "Circular A-4," 87 which is
designed to define good regulatory analysis for standardizing the manner in which the
costs and benefits of federal regulatory actions are measured and reported.88  A
comprehensive document, summarizing many of the precepts of economic analysis,
OMB's Circular requires that economic analyses be transparent with reproducible
results. 89 In addition, agencies "should clearly set out the basic assumptions, methods,
and data underlying the analysis and discuss the uncertainties associated with the
estimates."
90
While Graham contends that OMB is operating at an "unprecedented level of
transparency," 91 critics deride him as being "an industry ally who has a long record of
crusading against health, safety and environmental standards." 92 Graham's critics have
alleged that his approach is anything but scientific. Far from increasing transparency
and information quality, they claim that Graham's increased use of the "return letter,"
the administration's method of informing an agency that its work or regulation does not
pass muster, is simply another tool of economic analysis by which a potential agency
may be quashed.
93
As a strict adherent of the conservative principles of economic analysis of law,
Graham is expected to strictly enforce the DQA by requiring that regulations be based
on quality data and accepted science, and not on specially ordered research that reaches
alternative conclusions.94  For its part, the DQA could serve to augment the
considerable power that resides within OIRA.
95
85. Id.
86. Dudley, supra note 66, at 5.
87. OMB Circular A-4, supra note 43, at 1.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id.
91. Marty Coyne, Players Dispute Effectiveness of White House Transparency on Rules, GREENWIRE,
Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/searcharchive/test-search-display.cgi?q=
players+dispute&file=%2FGreenwire%2Fsearcharchive%2FNewsline%2F2003%2FOct30%2FI 0300302.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
92. Phineas Fiske, White House Should Give This Nomination a Push, NEWSDAY, June 20,2001, at A28.
93. Nakashima, supra note 78, at A35 (contending that by comparison, the Clinton Administration sent
no return letters during its final three years).
94. Ostroff, supra note 51.
95. James T. O'Reilly, Administrative Law Discussion Forum: The 411 on 515: How OIRA 's Expanded
Information Rules in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 835,
837 (2002).
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2. Enacted Statutes Addressing Data Quality
a. The Regulatory Flexibility Act
In 1980, Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA"), 96 which requires
that agencies consider the effect of regulation on small business entities. 97 For agency
rulemakings subject to notice and comment under APA § 553, the RFA requires that the
agencies conduct a Regulatory Flexibility ("Reg-Flex") Analysis.98 The components of
a Reg-Flex Analysis include a description of why the action is being taken,99 an
explanation of the legal basis and objective of the rule,100 and consideration of
alternatives to the rule.101  In 1996, Congress amended the RFA with the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act ("SBREFA"). 102  SBREFA provided
new tools to ensure that agencies properly review the impact of proposed rules on small
entities. 103
b. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 104 agencies must prepare a written
statement of the benefits and costs prior to issuing a proposed or final rule that may
result in an aggregate annual expenditure by a state or local government, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more.105
c. The Paperwork Reduction Act
In order to address data quality and ensure that agencies act solely upon good
information, Congress enacted the Paperwork Reduction Act ("PRA"), 106 which
directed that OIRA "provide direction and oversee ... agency dissemination of public
access to information." 10 7  OIRA was directed to develop and implement policies,
principles, and guidelines for the dissemination of public information by a federal
agency, "regardless of the form or format in which such information is
96. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (2003).
97. Id. § 602.
98. Id. § 603(a)-(b).
99. Id. § 603(b)(1).
100. Id. § 603(b)(2).
101. Id. § 603(c).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2003).
103. Greene, supra note 28, at 611. As part of SBREFA, the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801
et seq. (1996), allows Congress sixty days to review and reject new proposed federal regulations. Id. §
801(a)(3)(A). Should any member of Congress object to the regulation, he or she may introduce a
"Resolution of Disapproval," which then comes up for a majority vote before both houses of Congress. Id. §
801(a)(3)(B). If the president then signs the resolution, the proposed regulation is thwarted. Id.
104. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2000).
105. Id. § 1532(a).
106. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3549 (2000).
107. Id. § 3504(a)(l)(B)(ii).
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disseminated."' 10 8 In addition, the PRA requires that each federal agency manage its
information resources to "improve the integrity, quality, and utility of information to all
users within and outside the agency, including capabilities for ensuring dissemination of
public information." 10 9 With respect to information dissemination, each agency must:
(1) ensure that the public has timely and equitable access to the agency's public
information, including ensuring such access through-
(A) encouraging a diversity of public and private sources for information based
on government public information;...
(B) providing timely and equitable access to the underlying data (in whole or in
part); and
(C) agency dissemination of public information in an efficient, effective, and
110
economical manner.
Finally, the PRA requires that agencies, to the maximum extent practicable, use
information technology to improve data quality.l I
3. Congressional Legislation Addressing Data Quality
For the past few decades, Congress, like the Executive Branch, has expressed a
sustained and growing interest in regulatory reform addressing elements of economic
analysis of law-in particular, with legislation addressing tools to improve the
regulatory process. In recent years, Congress has shown a growing emphasis on data
and information quality, culminating with the enactment of the DQA in the 106th
Congress and continuing under the Republican-controlled 108th Congress.
a. 103rd Congress
The 103rd Congress addressed a number of proposals focusing on regulatory
reform and transparency in government. For example, the House Science Committee
considered the Risk Assessment Improvement Act, which addressed aspects of federal
risk assessment. 112 The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1994113 contained
provisions for CBA and transparency in agency rulemaking. 114  Finally, the Risk
Communication Act of 1993115 required EPA's risk communication to be based on
108. Id. § 3504(d)(1).
109. Id. § 3506(b)(1)(C).
110. Id. § 3506(d)(1)(A)-(C).
111. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(3)(J) (2000).
112. H.R. 4306, 103d Cong. (1994).
113. S. 2019, 103d Cong. (1994).
114. Id. § 15 (stating that "the [EPA] Administrator shall also estimate the private and public costs and
benefits associated with selected major Federal actions chosen by the Administrator that have the most
significant impact on human health or the environment").
115. H.R. 2910, 103d Cong. (1993).
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sound science and transparent assumptions. All three of these measures failed to
become law.
b. 104th Congress
During the 104th Congress, there was a concerted effort to establish data quality,
peer review, and best available evidence procedures on a comprehensive basis acrossS116
federal regulatory agencies. The Republican "Contract for America" in 1994 sparked
a renewed interest in economic analysis of law, and marked the transformation of
America into a "cost-benefit state" where "its performance will be assessed ...by
comparing the costs of government action with its benefits." 117 For instance, the House
Governmental Affairs Committee scheduled a series of six hearings addressing various
issues of regulatory reform. 118 One of the hearings specifically addressed the issue of
CBA.
119
The House passed the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, 12 which
covered a broad range of risk-related ideas, including CBA for major rules, and would
have applied to all federal agencies that implemented regulatory programs designed to
protect public health, safety, and environmental laws. The House also passed the
Paperwork Elimination Act of 1996,121 which proposed to amend the Paperwork
Reduction Act by incorporating alternative information technologies to improve data
quality. 122
In addition, the Senate considered the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of
1995 ("CRRA"). 123 Senator Orrin Hatch introduced Amendment 1554 to the CRRA,
which stated that when an agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking for a major
rule, "the agency shall issue and place in the rulemaking file an initial cost-benefit
analysis, and shall include a summary of such analysis in the notice of proposed
rulemaking."'
124
Senator Hatch's amendment also included a subchapter of risk assessments that
addressed data quality concerns. 12 5 In performing risk assessments, each agency was
directed to (1) use only "the best reasonably available scientific data and scientific
understanding," (2) select data "based on a reasoned analysis of the quality and
116. Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10232 (reporting that the issues were debated extensively and passed
through the House in a reconciliation bill, but that extensive language did not get through the Senate).
117. Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (1998) (citing Cass R. Sunstein,
Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN L. REv. 247,
249 (1996)). McGarity argues that CBA may eventually be used by powerful interest groups to "undermine
the regulatory walls that Congress has erected to protect human health and the environment." Id. at 12.
118. Press Release, House Governmental Affairs Committee, Continuation of Regulatory Reform
Hearings (Feb. 13, 1995) (stating that the Committee considered at least seven regulatory reform bills).
119. Id.
120. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995).
121. H.R. 2715, 104th Cong. (1996).
122. Id. § 5(c). Similar bills were considered, but not enacted, in subsequent legislative sessions. See
Paperwork Elimination Act of 1997, H.R. 852, 105th Cong. (1997); Paperwork Elimination Act of 1999, H.R.
439, 106th Cong. (1999); Paperwork Elimination Act of 200 1, H.R. 749, 107th Cong. (2001).
123. S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995).
124. 145 CONG. REc. Sl0,017 (daily ed. July 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
125. Id. at S 10,020.
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relevance of the data," and (3) "consider whether the data were published in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature, or developed in accordance with . . . other appropriate
protocols to ensure data quality."'
126
In 1995, the Senate also considered the Regulatory Procedures Reform Act.127 The
Act would have required that federal agencies conduct a CBA before publishing a
"major rule." 128 In evaluating and comparing costs and benefits, "the agency shall not
rely on cost, benefit, or risk assessment information that is not accompanied by data,
analysis, or other supporting materials that would enable the agency and other persons
interested in the rulemaking to assess the accuracy, reliability, and uncertainty factors
applicable to such information. ' 129  Finally, for the purposes of risk assessments,
agencies would have to "consider whether the data were developed in accordance with
good scientific practice or other protocols to ensure data quality."'
130
c. 105th Congress
The trend towards transparency continued into the 105th Congress, which
addressed data quality and economic analysis in the Less Pollution Through
Technology Act of 1997,131 in which Congress directed EPA to design and implement a
"performance-based measurement system ...to encourage the development of new
environmental monitoring technologies."'132  Congress failed to enact the Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1997,133 which would have required that agencies conduct risk
assessments based on "scientific and economic analysis."' 134  In addition, the Small
Business Programs Reauthorization and Amendments Acts of 1997135 addressed
economic analysis and data quality in a Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan
monitoring system.136 The SBA Administrator must "determine data quality standards
and control systems for ensuring information accuracy"' 137 and "analyze the benefits
and costs of alternatives and use to demonstrate the advantage of the final project."'
138
126. Id.
127. S. 1001, 104th Cong. (1995).
128. Id. § 621(4)(A) (The Regulatory Procedures Reform Act defines a "major rule" as "a rule or a group
of closely related rules that the agency proposing the rule ... reasonably determines is likely to have a gross
annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably quantifiable direct and indirect costs.").
129. Id. § 622(e)(2)(A). For major rules, agencies would issue and place in the rulemaking file an initial
cost-benefit analysis and then provide, pursuant to APA § 553, the public with an opportunity to comment.
Id. § 622(c)(1)(A)-(B). When publishing a final major rule, the agency shall also file a final CBA, and a
summary of the analysis in the rule's statement of basis and purpose. Id. § 622(d)(1).
130. Id. § 634(b)(3).
131. H.R. 3065, 105th Cong. (1997).
132. Id.
133. S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997).
134. Id.§2.
135. H.R. 2261, 105th Cong. (1997).
136. Id. § 204.
137. Id. § 204(a)(4).
138. Id. § 204(a)(6).
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d. 106th Congress
The 106th Congress passed the DQA as part of a Treasury appropriations bill.
139
In addition, the House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency
Management held a hearing entitled "Program Data Quality." 140  The House also
considered the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2000,141 which addressed CBA of major
rules and stated that "[t]he public has the right to know about . . . the quality of
scientific and economic analysis used to support decisions. Such knowledge will
promote the quality, integrity, responsiveness, and acceptability of agency actions."
' 142
The Second Generation of Environmental Improvement Act of 1999143 required the
EPA Administrator to submit to Congress and publish in the Federal Register a plan for
all of the EPA's information activities. 144 The Act required the EPA to, inter alia,
"establish procedures to assure data quality . .. and accuracy, including the detection
and correction of errors both prior to and following public dissemination."
145
Finally, the Federal Information Policy Act of 2000146 addressed information
quality in the federal government by establishing a Federal Chief Information Officer
and an Office of Information Policy in the Executive Office of the President. 147 The
Act required that, in its collection of information, the federal government must use




Despite the revolution that John Graham has continued at OMB, Congress
continues to address governmental transparency and information quality. For instance,
the Department of Environmental Protection Act 149 proposed to rename the EPA,
elevate it to a Cabinet-level agency, 15 and create a Bureau of Environmental Statistics
"to provide . . . such environmental quality and related public health and economic
information, and such evaluation and analyses of such information . . . to meet
adequately and fully the needs of the Department." 151 Much like language contained in
the DQA, the Director of the new agency was charged with "ensuring that data and
measures referred to . . . are accurate, reliable, relevant, and in a form that permits
139. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 (2001); see infra Part IV.
140. Program Data Quality. Hearing Before the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure: Subcomm.
on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, 106th Cong. (2000).
141. H.R. 3311,106th Cong. (1999).
142. Id. § 2(6).
143. H.R. 3448, 106th Cong. (1999).
144. Id. § 103(a).
145. Id. § 103(b)(3).
146. H.R. 5024, 106th Cong. (2000).
147. Id. § 2(b)(1).
148. Id. § 3606(c)(3)(C)(vii).
149. H.R. 2694, 107th Cong. (2001).
150. Id. § 101(a)(1).
151. Id. § 111(a).
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systematic analysis."' 152 The Director also had to make "readily accessible or, to the
extent practicable, disseminating all publicly available data ... in a timely manner and
using dissemination methods that will maximize the utility of such publicly available
information to the public."'
153
In addition, the Paperwork Elimination Acts of 1999 and 2001 proposed to amend
the Paperwork Reduction Act by, among other things, encouraging the use of
"alternative information technologies, that provide for electronic submission,
maintenance, or disclosure of information, to reduce the burden and improve data
quality, agency efficiency, and responsiveness to the public."'
154
f 108th Congress
With Republicans controlling both houses, the 108th Congress has focused
considerable attention on regulatory reform. In March 2003, Congress conducted a
hearing that surveyed the merits of establishing an independent peer review entity for
agency actions. 155 The Bush Administration has expressed support for H.R. 2138, a bill
that would elevate EPA to Cabinet-level status and create a Bureau of Environmental
Statistics that would provide for independent and expert monitoring and reporting of
environmental conditions.156
At least two proposed bills specifically reference the requirements of the Data
Quality Act. 157 In addition, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed the "belief
that data endorsed by the Federal Government should be of the highest quality and that
the public have the opportunity to review the data disseminated.., for its accuracy and
have available to it a streamlined procedure for correcting inaccuracies."
' 158
152. Id. § lll(c)(1)(C).
153. Id. § lll(c)(1)(F).
154. H.R. 439, 106th Cong. § 4(c) (1999); H.R. 541, 107th Cong. § 4(c) (2001); H.R. 749, 107th Cong. §
4(c) (2001).
155. See Independent Peer Review of Products that Support Agency Decision-Making: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure,
108th Cong. (2003).
156. Elevation of the Environmental Protection Agency to Department Level Status: Hearing on H.R. 37
and H.R. 2138 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 196, 202 (2003) (testimony of Marianne Lamont
Horinko, Acting Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (contending that an independent
Bureau of Environmental Statistics "will advance [EPA's] ability to achieve our shared goal of protecting
human health and the environment. Development of statistical measures will .. .fill identified gaps and
create information needed to allow the remainder of the Agency to measure progress against environmental
results.").
157. The Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 1844, 108th Cong. § 407(j)(2)(D) (2003) ("The Administrator shall
make a determination based on the study and other information satisfying the criteria of the Data Quality Act
whether to establish emissions limitations"); The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation
Equity Act of 2004, S. 1072, 108th Cong. § 4250 (2003) ("[T]he Inspector General for the Department of
Transportation shall audit the compliance reviews.., and submit a report ... on... whether the public access
information in the Safety Status Measurement System meets the agency's requirements under the Data
Quality Act.").
158. S. REP. No. 108-1046, at 136 (2004).
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IV. THE DATA QUALITY ACT-BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION
A. General Background
The Data Quality Act ("DQA") was originally enacted in December 2000 as a
little-noticed rider to a Treasury appropriations bill introduced by Representative Jo
Anne Emerson of Missouri. 15 9 Signed into law by President Bill Clinton, the DQA
provides:
In General-The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, by not later
than September 30, 2001, and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue
guidelines under sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 of Title 44, United States Code, that
provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including
statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies in fulfillment of the
purposes and provisions of Chapter 35 of Title 44, United States Code, commonly
referred to as the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Content of Guidelines-The guidelines under subsection (a) shall-
(1) apply to the sharing of Federal agencies of, and access to, information
disseminated by Federal agencies; and
(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines apply-
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by the agency, by not later than 1 year after the date of
issuance of the guidelines under subsection (a);
(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to
seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated
by the agency that does not comply with the guideline issued under
subsection (a); and
(C) report periodically to the Director-
(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the agency
regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by the agency
and;
159. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
515 (2001); Background on Data Quality Guidelines, OMB Watch, May 28, 2002, available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/773/l/I (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005).
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160(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
The DQA requires agencies to (1) ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity,
utility, and integrity of information that they disseminate, (2) establish an administrative
process that allows affected persons to seek and obtain correction of that information,
and (3) report yearly to the OMB concerning the receipt and resolution of complaints.
In plainer language, the DQA affords affected individuals with the opportunity to file a
request for correction ("RFC") and, if necessary, a petition for reconsideration if the
scientific, technical, statistical, or financial information in question does not meet DQA
standards.
161
By May 1, 2002, each agency covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act 162 was
required to publish information quality guidelines and to allow for a period of public
comment. By July 1, 2002, these agencies were required to draft reports, revised to
reflect public comments, and submit them to OMB for review. 63 Finally, by October 1,
2002, each covered agency published information quality guidelines in their final
form. 
64
The DQA was enacted without congressional hearings and very limited legislative
history. 165 Because of this utter lack of guidance, there is no way to discern the breadth
or impact intended by Congress. However, on February 22, 2002, as mandated by the
DQA, OMB published Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies
("OMB Guidelines") 166 to guide agencies concerning the implementation of the DQA.
Here follows a brief summary of some of the key language contained in the DQA, as
interpreted by OMB.
B. Dissemination
The DQA applies to any information that an agency "disseminates" to the public
for the first time after October 1, 2002,167 but it fails to expressly define what
constitutes dissemination. According to OMB's Guidelines, dissemination includes any
"agency initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the public."' 168 OMB
defines "information" to include "any communication or representation of knowledge
160. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
515.
161. Frederick R. Anderson, The Practice: Administrative Law: Data Quality Act, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 14,
2002, available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/2004062 l-data-qualityact.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
162. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2000).
163. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002).
164. Id. at 8453.
165. The Conference Report for the DQA provided the following brief language: "The Committee
includes a new provision requiring the OMB to develop guidelines for ensuring and maximizing the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by federal agencies." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-
756 83 (2000).
166. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8452.
167. Id. at 8459.
168. Id. at 8460.
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such as facts and data, in any medium of form, including textual, numerical, graphic,
cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms."' 16 9  Information may be "influential,"
covering the scientific, financial, or statistical information upon which an agency
relies, 17 regardless of whether such information was generated by the government itself
or a private third party.
What gives the DQA its bite is its wide range of potential applicability. 171 The
DQA applies not only to the information that an agency includes in a proposed
rulemaking, but also to information that it releases via informal actions. In this
information age, sparked by the Internet revolution, the wide range of potential informal
dissemination is staggering. 172  Outside of the traditional administrative rulemaking
context, agencies disseminate information in published studies, guidance documents, or
reports. 173 These publications invariably include the dissemination of information, thus
opening the door to a DQA challenge. The DQA could apply to a seemingly limitless
number of instances. 1
74
In the administrative rulemaking context, information quality is at a premium.
According to one commentator:
Information is thus a prerequisite for participation in the rulemaking processes....
Participants must have some capacity to develop information upon which to base
comments.... The possession or lack of information ... effectively circumscribes
the set of parties 'eligible' to participate in the development of rules."
17 5
However, procedural protections provided by the APA would force an agency to
consider DQA concerns that arise from the notice and comment process. Because of
these pre-existing APA protections, the DQA will most likely impact the informal, non-




171. Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10226 (describing the DQA enactment as an "October Revolution" that
"potentially packs quite a wallop, because of the implications of information today. Information is power.").
172. Conrad, supra note 8, at 527 (arguing that a dramatic change in government information
dissemination has resulted from the advent of the lawsuit, the ubiquity of computers, and the rising
importance of agency websites).
173. Id. (asserting that "[v]irtually all new documents released publicly by federal agencies, and many
historic documents, are now available on [agency] websites").
174. The OMB specifies that the DQA will not apply to information requested under Freedom of
Information Act requests, or the distribution of an agency's correspondence with individuals, press releases,
archival records, public filings, subpoenas, or adjudicative processes. Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies,
67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8460 (Feb. 22, 2002).
175. Steven Croley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1519-20 (1995) (reviewing
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY
(1994)) (reporting the results of a survey of interest groups participating in the rulemaking, in that 83.4 % of
the surveyed groups suggest that they "almost always" raise issues concerning the quality of information
supporting a proposed rule).
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C. Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
The DQA also requires that agencies ensure the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of disseminated information. 176 Again, the statute in itself fails to define these
terms. OMB defines "quality" as an encompassing term that is comprised of "utility,
objectivity, and integrity."' 77 "Utility" is defined as the "usefulness of the information
to its intended users."'178  OMB defines "integrity" as referring to the security of
information, how agencies are required to protect information from unauthorized access
or revision and ensure that the information is not compromised through corruption or
falsification. 1
79
Perhaps most significant is the DQA's "objectivity" requirement. 18 0 OMB has
defined this term as having dual contexts-both in terms of "presentation" and of
"substance."' 18 1 When information is "accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased," it is
presented in an objective manner. 182  Substantive objectivity focuses on "ensuring
accurate, reliable, and unbiased information." ' 183 It requires that scientific, statistical,
and financial information be generated or developed according to sound scientific and
research methods.1
84
Industry will undoubtedly use the objectivity definition to submit specific DQA
challenges, arguing that information is inaccurate, incomplete, or not subject to sound
research methods. For example, in June 2002, the EPA proposed effluent limitation
guidelines for the construction and development industry. 185  Several trade
organizations 186 submitted comments challenging the economic assumptions underlying
the proposed rules. The organizations commented that for apartment properties, the
EPA "failed to properly assess the cost associated with current compliance activities
and is underestimating the costs of the new rule."
' 187
Though not specifically addressed, this situation appeared to be the perfect
situation for submitting an RFC raising the DQA's objectivity requirements. For
instance, the EPA assumed that multi-family construction occurs in the same manner
and duration as in single-family housing and that each project phase-land acquisition,
176. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515 (2001).
177. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 8460.
180. Id. at 8459-60.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 8459.
183. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
184. Id. (stating that "if data and analytical results have been subjected to formal, independent peer
review," one can presume acceptable objectivity).
185. Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Construction and
Development Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,644 (June 24, 2002).
186. The trade organizations included the National Multi Housing Council ("NMHC"), the National
Apartment Association ("NAA"), and the Associated General Contractors of America.
187. NMHC/NAA ELG Comments, Attachment 3-The Effect of EPA's Proposed Rule on the Multi-
Family Housing Industry 89, Dec. 23, 2002, available at http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeFile.cfm?
FilelD=3317 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
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development, and construction-takes twelve months.188 The organizations introduced
evidence that contradicted these assumptions, suggesting that the multifamily project
phase was between 6.5 and 9.5 years. 189 Under the substantive objectivity prong of the
DQA, the organizations could have requested that the EPA make corrections to or
redact inaccurate and unreliable information that was not properly tailored to fit the
multifamily housing industry. They could have also asserted that the EPA's
assumptions were biased, as the proposed rule's economic analysis maintains that the
information derived from single family housing focus groups set up by the National
Association of Home Builders. 19  In terms of presentation objectivity, the
organizations could have argued that the information underlying the rule was
incomplete. 
191
While the aforementioned organizations could have filed a DQA challenge, its
ultimate chance of success was questionable. Because the DQA challenge would have
arisen in an informal rulemaking, the EPA could have easily dismissed any DQA issues
by generally suggesting in its response to comments that it considered DQA
implications of the proposed rule. 192  What is certain is that regulated industry will
seemingly raise the DQA issue each and every time that it believes the rule or action is
not objective-and that agencies will be forced to address these challenges.
D. Influential Information
For DQA purposes, the OMB requires that agencies employ heightened scrutiny
before adopting "influential information."1 93 The OMB defines influential information
188. Id.
189. Id. The organizations also asserted that, contrary to the EPA's assumptions, multifamily property
developers do not operate under a system of cross-subsidization, but rather more typically as a self-funded
enterprise, usually as an independent limited liability partnership or limited liability company. On April 1,
2004, the EPA opted against imposing ELGs for the construction and development industry, instead relying
on a range of existing programs, regulations, and initiatives at the federal, state, and local level for the control
of storm water runoff from construction sites. See Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: Final
Action-Selection of a Non-Regulatory Option (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/guide/
construction/final-action-fs.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004). In its withdrawal of the proposed rule, EPA
stated that the NMHC and the NAA:
commented on certain issues with our methodology. They also provided data to replace
assumptions EPA had made on the duration of projects, timing of expenditures, and financial
independence of a firm's individual projects from other projects. We reviewed the information
and found that it contained valid assumptions for the modeling. Thus, we now consider ...
multifamily projects to be independent (not cross-subsidized by other projects) and have set the
duration... of multifamily projects to nine years.
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Construction and
Development Category, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,476, 22,476 (Apr. 26, 2004).
190. NMHC/NAA ELG Comments, supra note 187, at 90.
191. The NAHB surveyed its membership to create an Erosion and Sediment Control/Stormwater
Management Ordinance Summary. This chart revealed the duplicative nature of the EPA's proposed rule, in
that at least 41 states had already passed ordinances dealing with sediment and erosion control and storm
water runoff for residential construction and development. In addition, the NMHC and the NAA surveyed
their membership and learned that on a typical, 300-unit garden apartment community, with 18 units per acre,
compliance costs would amount to $1,350 per acre-far in excess of the EPA's estimate of $59 per acre. Id.
at 90-91.
192. See supra Part IV.B.
193. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8457 (Feb. 22, 2002).
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as having a "clear and substantial impact on important public policies or important
private sector decisions."' 194 For purposes of the DQA, an agency must provide a "high
degree of transparency" for influential information. 195 This may be achieved by the
"reproducibility" of information by qualified third parties. 196 The OMB also requires
that agencies engaging in health, safety, and environmental risk analyses must "adopt or
adapt" the demanding quality standards contained in the Safe Drinking Water Act.
197
These include applying the "best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting
studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices" and
"data collected by accepted methods or best available methods (if the reliability of the
method and the nature of the decision justifies use of the data)."1
9 8
To mount DQA challenges, industry will likely address the definition of
"influential information," which includes any regulatory decision affecting the public
health and welfare and decisions affecting the environment. 199  This expansive
definition will enable industry to make DQA challenges on the myriad issues to which
they are fundamentally opposed. As a hypothetical example, the United States Center
for Disease Control's Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention
recently considered lowering the permissible threshold level ("intervention level") for
childhood exposure to lead from 10 pg/dL to 5 pg/dL.20 A study by the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences suggested that "children who have blood
lead concentrations lower than 10 micrograms per deciliter suffer intellectual
impairment from the exposure . . . [and] that the amount of impairment attributed to
lead was most pronounced at lower levels."
20 1
Because such a change would have significant ramifications across society as well
as heightened compliance costs, regulated industry will challenge such a rule as a matter
of course. Regardless of what information is disseminated, industry groups will argue
that the CDC has failed to satisfy the DQA's objectivity prong by neglecting to consider
relevant studies that conclude that "there is still substantial uncertainty with respect to
health outcomes of childhood lead exposure resulting in [blood lead levels] below 10
-,202.tg/dL. Regardless of the ultimate outcomes, the mere fact that industry can submit
194. Id. at 8460 (maintaining that for influential data, agencies must "include a high degree of




197. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)-(B)).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2003) (listing additional requirements, including: "(i) each
population addressed by any estimate of public health effects; (ii) the expected risk or central estimate of risk
for the specific populations; (iii) each appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate of risk; (iv) each
significant uncertainty identified in the process of the assessment of public health effects and studies that
would assist in resolving the uncertainty; and (v) peer-reviewed studies known to the Administrator that
support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any estimate of public health effects and the methodology
used to reconcile inconsistencies in the scientific data." Id. § 300g- I (b)(3)(B)(i)-(iv)).
199. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8460 (Feb. 22, 2002).
200. Susan M. Bernard, Should the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 's Childhood Lead
Poisoning Intervention Level Be Lowered?, 93 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1253, 1253 (2003).
201. Lead Deemed Harmful Even at Very Low Blood Concentrations, 16 ASBESTOS & LEAD ABATEMENT
REP. 6 (2003).
202. Bernard, supra note 200, at 1255 (concluding that "[sietting lead cleanup and abatement targets to
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these challenges under the DQA could significantly hinder the actions of federal
agencies.
E. Pre-Dissemination Review
OMB Guidelines require that information disseminated by federal agencies after
October 1, 2002, must undergo internal pre-dissemination review before it is released to
the public. 203 Specifically, OMB Guidelines require that "[t]his process shall enable the
agency to substantiate the quality of information it has disseminated through
documentation or other means appropriate to the information."
20
4
While this process is intended to "enable the agency to substantiate the quality of
information it has disseminated, ' ° 5 in practice it may have a negligible beneficial
effect. To avoid a DQA request, an agency would just have to expressly state, in the
published response to comments in a rulemaking, or within a guidance document, that
the information had in fact been subjected to pre-dissemination review. It would seem
difficult for an affected party to prevail on a challenge centering on the sufficiency of
the review. Only if an agency admits to not having performed the review, an unlikely
scenario, would an affected party be able to temporarily forestall agency action until a
review is completed.
20 6
F. Administrative Complaint Process
Under the DQA, agencies are expected to maintain "administrative mechanisms"
that permit "affected persons to seek and obtain ... timely correction of information
maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with OMB or agency
guidelines." 20 7 These mechanisms should be "flexible, appropriate to the nature and
timeliness of the disseminated information" and "incorporated into agency information
resources management and administrative practices."'208  In addition, agencies must
establish "appropriate" time periods to respond to administrative complaints, 209 and to
provide an "administrative appeal process to review the agency's initial decision and
specify appropriate time limits in which to resolve such requests for reconsideration."
' 2 10
achieve postabatement exposure of no more than 10 pag/dL does not adequately protect children's health and
may in some cases be contrary to federal environmental health laws and policies").
203. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Alternatively, pre-dissemination review could serve to significantly improve information quality, by
correcting errors at the end of the regulatory process-a process that would subsequently reduce potential
DQA challenges.
207. Id. Agencies are not required to establish new procedures for information that is utilized in the
rulemaking process; if the process is insufficient to meet this objective an agency should reform the existing
process rather than create duplicative processes. Id.
208. Id.
209. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
210. Id. The administrative challenge mechanism applies to information disseminated after the same date,
regardless of when it was first disseminated.
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The DQA's potential power lies in the administrative mechanism. A recent RFC to
the EPA highlights the possible type of challenge that the DQA could permit. On
March 10, 2004, a host of business and real estate trade organizations, led by the
National Multi Housing Council, filed an RFC challenging information contained in an
EPA policy entitled "Applicability of Safe Drinking Water Act to Submetered
Properties."'2 11 The petitioning organizations took issue with a single assertion in the
EPA's policy.2 12  The requestors contended that the EPA's assertion violated the
DQA's requirements of pre-dissemination review, as well as its objectivity and utility
prongs. 213 Most significantly, the parties tendered a specific request for correction to
the EPA. They implored the EPA to (1) disclose the process that the statement at issue
underwent as part of the internal agency pre-dissemination review, (2) conduct a
comprehensive literature review of the established studies, (3) correct the statement in
the revised policy, and (4) reissue its revised policy with corrected information.
214
Under the APA's provisions for notice and comment rulemaking, the APA
obligates an agency to respond to data quality concerns raised in comments.
215
However, because of agencies increasing use and reliance on information dissemination
outside of the rulemaking context, 2 16 agencies will be forced to address these RFCs in a
timely and specific manner. In a perfect world, where agencies could spend unlimited
time and resources in addressing these RFCs, information quality would improve by
necessity and circumstance. If the agency fails to correct these alleged information
problems, the requestors could then petition for a reconsideration, the denial of which
could constitute "final" agency action, thereby opening the door to litigation against the
agency.
V. INTEREST GROUP RESPONSE TO THE DQA
A. Industry and Business Groups: Decidedly in Favor of the DQA
To supporters, the DQA is "an innocuous call for federal agencies to improve the
accuracy of their data."'217 In addition to being harmless, they argue that the Act is a
necessary foundation for "improvement in the overall quality of information which the
211. 68 Fed. Reg. 74,233 (Dec. 23, 2003).
212. See NMHC/NAA Request for Correction, Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/
informationguidelines/documents/04017.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter NMHC/NAA RFC].
The requestors took issue with the EPA's statement that the "EPA believes that RUBS[Ratio Utility Billing
Systems] or other allocation billing systems ... do not encourage water conservation." 68 Fed. Reg. 74,235 is
erroneous in light of the conclusions found in the open literature on this topic. Id. at 2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 9.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2004).
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. Bryant Urstadt, One-Act Farce, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, June 1, 2003, at 52; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE FEDERAL GOvERNMENT, Mar. 21, 2002,
at 25 [hereinafter "NAS WORKSHOP #1"] (reporting that the OMB believes that the DQA will move agencies
in a direction of heightened transparency regarding underlying assumptions, so that reviewers may
specifically trace the reasoning behind agency action).
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federal government disseminates to the public. 21 8  It has also rectified a glaring
omission of the APA and prior administrative legal framework: the inability to provide
clear accountability for government use of information to accomplish policy goals.
2 19
The DQA could also benefit agency credibility by enhancing transparency through the
required reproducibility of scientific studies and improved fact checking.
220
Predictably, industry and pro-business groups have applauded the loudest over the
enactment of the DQA.22 1 The DQA is commonly regarded as the brainchild of Jim
Tozzi,2 2 2 an industry lobbyist with the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, a pro-
business think-tank located in Washington, D.C.223  One explanation for the law's
enactment was that corporate interests wanted to counter indiscriminate "data dumps"
of information into federal Internet sites.2 2 4  Whatever the reasons underlying its
enactment, the DQA, according to Tozzi, is "turning out to be a lot more significant
than we thought it would be. . . . It sets standards for which you can now judge
whatever the government issues."
22 5
DQA supporters argue that ensuring the quality of information at the time of
dissemination-rather than years down the road, after businesses have spent billions of
dollars complying with flawed regulations-is the precise justification for the DQA.
Supporters have pointed to a number of instances in which agencies have used flawed
data-and in which the DQA could have provided a measure of relief. In 2002, an EPA
study utilized to establish Clean Air Act standards for the regulation of industry was
found to contain a software error.2 26 The program exaggerated the reported effects of
218. Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Generic Comments to All Federal Agencies Related to Data
Quality Guidelines, at www.thecre.com/pdf/2002053 lcre-generic.pdf_(last visited May. 4, 2005).
219. Conrad, supra note 8, at 526.
220. O'Reilly, supra note 95, at 848. One could argue that while the DQA may be the latest step in the
economic analysis of law movement, it also fits into a pattern of laws that actually address transparency in
government legislation. See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); Levy & Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 506 (citing the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000) (requiring that any agency headed by a
multi-member commission meet in public) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, id. at App. §§ 1-16
(2000) (requiring federal advisory committees to meet in open session)).
221. The United States Chamber of Commerce has put together a Data Quality Working Group. The
Working Group is comprised of a broad coalition of industry and pro-business interests, including the
American Chemistry Council, Dow Chemicals, the National Multi Housing Council, National Association of
Realtors, National Federation of Independent Business, the American Trucking Association, Fannie Mae,
ExxonMobil, the Heritage Foundation, the Edison Electrical Institute, and various law firms. The Working
Group met regularly in the period immediately following enactment of the DQA, and in the period in which
the individual agencies promulgated their own information quality guidelines. The Working Group continues
to meet to discuss potential legislative updates to the DQA and litigation concerns, and to review pending and
completed DQA challenges.
222. Tozzi worked at the OMB from 1972 to 1983 and served as deputy director of the OMB's Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs. Pat Phibbs, Lawsuit Charges White House Climate Report Fails to Meet
Federal Information Standards, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS DAILY ENV'T REPORT, Aug. 13, 2003, at A-5.
223. See Sidney Shapiro, An Overview of the Data Quality Act (forthcoming) (on file with author).
Interest in the DQA piqued in 1999 when Ropes & Gray, a law firm, published a white paper arguing that
"there were insufficient protections for those who might be adversely affected when agencies produced
information on the web and in reports." Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10229. In 2001, the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates recommended that agencies provide procedural protections for individuals
concerning information contained on such media. Id.
224. Anderson, supra note 161.




air pollution on human health by an estimated twenty-three percent.227 According to
the United States Chamber of Commerce, the EPA's program was two years old when
the error was discovered; the DQA could have provided the channel for faster relief.
228
Explained William Kovacs, Vice President of Environment and Technology at the
Chamber of Commerce: "The data-quality issue is so basic.... You've got to use
good data and make sure the assumptions they use are correct."
229
In addition, heightened information transparency can yield significant benefits for
both regulated entities and industry. For instance, certain information, like the EPA's
Toxic Release Inventory Program disclosure, does not impose additional regulations, or
exact any enforceable obligations or preventative action, on regulated industry.
230
Rather, the information is necessary for maintaining a healthy environment-and
maintaining accurate and current information is a key component to the program's
success. Finally, there is no reason to assume that the DQA will not find support in
parties who are traditionally opposed to industry and business interests. For example,
pro-environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, could use the DQA to challenge
industry-sponsored science. And, if the purpose of the DQA is truly to foster
transparency in disseminated government information, then individual citizens and
public interest groups, when they encounter what they perceive to be incorrect
information, could submit the same DQA challenge as industry-with the same
potential range of results.
B. "Paralysis by Analysis ": Critics Believe that the DQA Will Further Ossify the
Administrative Process
Critics fear that the DQA has rendered an already precarious legal framework for
regulating industry conduct even more unstable. Prior to the DQA's enactment, no
specific legal mechanism existed for challenging the information underlying agency
action.23 1 The APA's standards of review-arbitrary and capricious and abuse of
discretion-address the political decision-making merits of a decision. As its title
suggests, the APA focuses on procedural issues as opposed to substantive ones.
There is a widespread fear that the DQA could represent an "over-correction" to the
aforementioned legal void. In the context of non-binding agency guidance (e.g., a
scientific study posted on an agency's web site), the DQA could become a "tool of
industry."'232  Industry could conceivably challenge any and all regulatory action.
Industry's innumerable actions will lead to agencies removing information from public





230. Letter from Thomas McGarity, President, Center for Progressive Regulation 4 (May 31, 2002),
available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/commentary/dataQuality.pdf (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005)
(stating that the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory only requires that facilities report information and that further
steps are up to industry).
231. See supra Parts I-Il.
232. Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10227.
233. Id. at 10229.
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This phenomenon could exacerbate what has been deemed to be the "ossification"
of administrative processes.234 Critics also argue that the law creates "reams of extra
paperwork" and hurdles that will complicate the federal rulemaking process.235 The
DQA imposes new review procedures to information before agencies will accept the
information. 236 While ostensibly intended to improve data, the DQA will, in reality,
through endless contention and challenges, actually suppress data.237  If DQA
challenges "provide the opportunity for diversion of agency effort and cost inflation, ....
it is . . . possible that the resulting administrative procedure will make [agency]
programs . . . less timely and cost effective." 238 In the words of Frank O'Donnell,
executive director of Clean Air Trust, the DQA is designed to "throw sand into the
gears of regulatory machinery."'239 This phenomenon has been described as "paralysis
by analysis" 240 or "death by data quality."24 1 Refraining from regulatory action until
data quality improves to an acceptable level could result in substantial public harm.
242
Herein lays a significant conflict within the DQA: the tension between an affected
party's access to markets that might be impaired by an airing of information quality
concerns versus the public's interest in having a government capable of responding
quickly to concerns. 243 For the individual, increased transparency has been described as
one of the "necessary preconditions to a properly functioning market."244 However, for
industry, transparency may be at a lesser premium, as many times it is industry itself
that is funding the science. The DQA could be used by industry to challenge the
science that it does not fund. Agencies would counter industry's challenges with
information generated by the agency itself or from outside sources who paid for the
studies. Such a situation would parallel the "battle of the experts" phenomenon that
characterizes typical American litigation.
In addition, there exists a fundamental paradox between the way that scientists and
regulators operate. 245  "Congress has required agencies to regulate on the basis of
234. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfield, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 533-34 (arguing that it is extremely difficult for an agency to promulgate a
rule, because of the sheer volume of information that must be gathered, technical and economic analyses, the
absence of key information on relevant questions, the need to draw inferences from existing data, large
uncertainties, and the professional judgment of staff that is attempting to achieve outcome-oriented regulatory
policy).
235. Urstadt, supra note 217, at 52.
236. Anderson, supra note 161.
237. Urstadt, supra note 217, at 52.
238. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 19, at 280.
239. Lorenzetti, supra note 8, at 31.
240. Vladeck, supra note 49.
241. Letter from Thomas McGarity, supra note 230, at 5.
242. Id. at 4 ("The danger is that data quality will become a goal in and of itself, rather than a way of
ensuring the most effective regulation possible under the circumstances. This danger is real."). See also
Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Sitting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585,
591-92 (1972) (arguing that the potential benefits of administrative procedure-including fairness and
accuracy-should be balanced against the "efficient disposition of agency business"); Celia Campbell-Mohn
& John S. Applegate, Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Regulation, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 93, 121-23 (1999).
243. NAS WORKSHOP #1, supra note 217, at 18 (arguing that the federal government does not have a
history of expeditious reaction to perceived environmental, health, and safety problems).
244. Letter from Thomas McGarity, supra note 230, at 4.
245. See generally Shapiro, supra note 223, at 9.
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incomplete information, rather than wait for more scientific studies while a hazard goes
unabated."'246 In contrast, scientists typically will refrain from drawing a conclusion
when they have failed to achieve "perfect knowledge." 247  Science can be an
evolutionary process, in which results and conclusions are often ambiguous or subject
to equally plausible interpretations. 248 According to Robert O'Keefe of the Health
Effects Institute, "[M]uch of the data we are trying to make perfect will never be perfect
given ... that this is an evolving art. Yet we need to make decisions based on that
imperfect data." 249 Finally, detractors argue that for data to be objective under the
DQA, independent scientists must agree on its validity. 25  This may lead to "limitless"
opportunities to lodge complaints about objectivity.
25 1
VI. DRAWING THE DA UBERT ANALOGY
In many ways, enactment of the DQA is a significant signpost in the history of
agency action. The DQA's potential impact is so significant that it has been deemed
"Regulatory Daubert,"252 a reference to the significant 1993 United States Supreme
Court decision 253 that drastically impacted the rules governing the admission of
scientific evidence in federal court proceedings. Just as Daubert and its progeny altered
the evidentiary landscape, the DQA threatens to radically change the ability of agencies
to regulate. To better judge the merits of this comparison, it is necessary to review how
Daubert has impacted the evolving history of evidentiary law.
A. A Brief History of Evidentiary Law
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Frye v. United States
254
governed admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Frye centered on a trial court's
refusal to admit evidence based on the forerunner of the modem lie detector test.
255
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that:
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
246. Id. See also Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 89 (1988) (arguing that the goal of governing is different from the goal of science).
247. See, e.g., NAS WORKSHOP #1, supra note 217, at 15; Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the
Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules,
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 361 (stating that in medical practice, physicians do not wait for conclusive studies
prior to making diagnoses with a reasonable degree of medical certainty).
248. NAS WORKSHOP # 1, supra note 217, at 15.
249. NAS WORKSHOP #2, supra note 14, at 20.
250. Anderson, supra note 161.
251. Id.
252. Elliott et al., supra note 13, at 10129.
253. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
254. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
255. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Frye Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388 (2001).
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made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.
256
Under Frye, if an expert's opinion is based upon a scientific theory or technique,
the theory and technique must be one that is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.257  To qualify as being generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community, Frye required a showing of wide acceptance, generally by either peer
review or publication, that the theory or evidence and was capable of being reliably
reproduced.
258
While Frye gradually spread throughout the early part of the 20th century, 259 by the
1950s, criticism of Frye's general acceptance test became more apparent. 26  The Frye
standard was commonly regarded as making the court a "conservative" gatekeeper to
distinguish between legitimate science and "junk science. ' 26 1 The criticisms include
that: (1) the general acceptance test was too restrictive on emerging science; (2) the
Frye holding was overly vague in failing to define "general acceptance"; and (3)
confusion among the judges led to contradictory rulings in varying jurisdictions.
262
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") went into effect. 263  FRE 702
states that any qualified expert who possesses "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue" may testify at trial.264 Under FRE 702, the expert's testimony must be
based on "sufficient facts or data," and must be the "product of reliable principles and
methods. ' 265 Also, if the facts or data in a particular case are of a type "reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted. ' 266 Finally, under the FRE, the judge remains the gatekeeper
of questions of evidentiary admissibility.
267
256. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
257. See Finley, supra note 247, at 340 (contending that under Frye, a scientific opinion must be
"generally accepted" within the scientific community in order to be admissible).
258. Id.
259. Bernstein, supra note 255, at 388-89 (arguing that Frye may not have been as slow to spread as some
scholars suggest, in large part because (1) some courts accepted the Frye holding without expressly citing it,
(2) Frye only applied to novel scientific techniques, and there were few novel techniques that the court did not
readily accept, and (3) most state court opinions are unpublished).
260. Id. at 389 (citing Professor Charles McCormick's treatise on evidence, which argued that the general
acceptance test "is a proper condition upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a
criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence").
261. Id.
262. Id. at 390.
263. See generally FED. R. EVID. (1975) (amended 2000).
264. FED. R. EVID. 702.
265. Id.
266. FED. R. EVID. 703.
267. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,




Daubert arose out of a dissatisfaction with Frye's general acceptance test and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 268 Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony
linking the use of Benedectin, an anti-nausea drug, with birth defects.2 6 9 The United
States Supreme Court held that the FRE should guide the courts, with judges acting as
evidentiary gatekeepers. 27  As such a gatekeeper, a trial judge must ensure that the
proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable.2 71 The judge must make
determinations about whether "the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue."
, 272
To help a trial judge make the Rule 702 determination, the Supreme Court provided
the following non-exclusive list of factors: (1) whether the theory or technique can be
and has been tested;273 (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication; 274 (3) the known or potential rate of error;275 (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; 276 and (5) whether
the theory or technique has been generally accepted by the scientific community.
27 7
While Daubert was enacted to liberalize evidentiary rules, in reality it has had the
exact opposite effect.278 In traditional Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, scientific questions
are resolved in litigation through the use of "expert" witnesses, who provide opinion
testimony.279 However, the FRE turned out to "provide[] limited guidance, and courts.
. tended to interpret them as allowing virtually any opinion testimony from a witness
who qualified as an expert." 280 Unlike fact witnesses, experts could be paid for their
268. Bernstein, supra note 255, at 390 (contending that during the 1980s, a number of influential
commentators began to focus on the reliability of expert testimony, and suggested lists of factors that courts
could examine to determine reliability).
269. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582-85.
270. Id. at 589.
271. See Andrew R. Stolfi, Note, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye's General Acceptance Standard for
the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 861, 866-67 (2003).
272. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The holding in Daubert has been extended by several subsequent cases.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court held that a court of appeals may not apply "a
particularly stringent standard of review" when considering a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 78 F.3d 524, 529 (1 lth Cir. 1997), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). In addition, a district
court may scrutinize the reliability of an expert's reasoning process and conclusions in addition to the general
methodology. Bernstein, supra note 255, at 386. In Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
extended the Daubert holding to non-scientific expert testimony and held that a trial judge may use the
Daubert technical criteria as a guide, and not a mandatory requirement. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
273. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 594.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 594-95.
278. See Finley, supra note 247, at 335 (arguing that after Daubert, federal judges have substantially
raised "the threshold of scientific proof plaintiffs need to get their expert causation testimony admitted").
279. Cliff Hutchinson & Robert Powell, A New Plague-Mold Litigation: How Junk Science and Hysteria
Built an Industry, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE'S INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM & THE CTR. FOR LEGAL POL'Y
AT THE MANHATTAN INST. 19 (2003), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2003/july/03-
126.htm (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005) (emphasis omitted).
280. Id.
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testimony-a financial reality that resulted in a thriving industry of "'hired gun'
testifiers who were willing to testify to whatever opinion was needed."
281
Perhaps the most significant fallout is how Daubert has been linked to "junk
science," a phenomenon commonly defined as "pseudo-scientific theories with no true
scientific basis, concocted ... to support a position in court."'282 Junk science typically
promotes information that has the sole purpose of promoting an individual's
ideology.
283
Much to the benefit of deep-pocketed defendants and to the chagrin of plaintiffs,
judges rigidly apply Daubert principles. In cases ranging from mass toxic torts to
occupational exposures to individual suits, filing a Daubert challenge to any and all
causation has become strategically necessary and routine. 284  In many cases, judges
have transformed their gatekeeper duty into one of a "junior scientist" charged with
analyzing and scrutinizing all expert evidence in an attempt to keep flawed science out
of the courtroom. 285 As a result, trial courts routinely strike "relevant and instructive
testimony of well-known and respected experts in their fields of expertise, even when
the evidence is methodologically sound and meets the two-pronged Daubert test of
relevance and reliability." 286 In addition, opposing parties will call experts to testify in
support of the scientific validity of a particular methodology, as opposed to causation
issues.287 Because of this trend, opposing parties "may find themselves out of luck if
they do not proffer testimony to support the methodology underlying the testimony of
the main causation witness/expert."'288 In the quest to keep junk science out of the
courthouse, Daubert has denied many deserving plaintiffs of their day in court.
C. How the DQA May Have a Similar Impact to Daubert
A recent administrative law trend has been the extension of Daubert principles to
the regulatory arena--creating what has been deemed "Regulatory Daubert," whereby
agency decisions in administrative actions must be grounded on reliable, sound science
281. Id. Hutchinson and Powell cite the following: Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45
("Today practicing lawyers can locate quickly and easily an expert to advocate nearly anything the lawyers
desire."); Sharon Begley, Ban on "Junk Science " Also Keeps Jurors From Sound Evidence, WALL ST. J., June
27, 2003, at BI (quoting the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine as stating that prior to
Daubert, "[i]t was pitiful how people with few credentials, who made a career out of courtroom testimony,
were hired to be expert witnesses").
282. Hutchinson & Powell, supra note 279, at 20 (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTHOUSE (1991)). See also Finley, supra note 247, at 338 (defining "junk science" as
expert opinions not being well founded in scientific methodology or being based on significant departures
from the mainstream of scientific opinion).
283. Elevation of the Environmental Protection Agency to Department Level Status: Hearing on H.R. 37
and H.R. 2138 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (attachment I to the statement of Dr. A. Alan
Moghissi, President, Institute for Regulatory Science), available at http://reform.house.gov/ UploadedFiles/9-
9-03%2OMoghissi%20Testimony.pdf (last viewed Mar. 21, 2005).
284. TEE L. GUIDOTTI & SUSAN G. ROSE, SCIENCE ON THE WITNESS STAND: EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN LAW, ADJUDICATION AND POLICY 82 (2001).
285. Id.
286. Id..
287. Id. at 86-87.
288. Id. at 87.
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to withstand judicial scrutiny.289 While federal case law has yet to specifically extend
Daubert principles to review agency actions, it seems logical that if an agency based an
action solely on unreliable information, a reviewing court could have adequate authority
to vacate and remand the rule.
290
By importing Daubert-type principles into judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, we can better define the principles of judicial review, make them more
consistent, and better advise the Agency, the public, and Congress of the standards the
EPA, as well as the Supreme Court, should apply in the review of agency science.
29 1
The idea behind Regulatory Daubert is to raise the bar for accepting agency action
to allow it only upon a showing of reliable and relevant data or information. Regulatory
Daubert could promote "the full disclosure of all of the Agency's underlying principles,
assumptions, and facts and obligate the Agency to come completely clean on the
foundation for its scientific decision. ' 292 Given such appropriate, full disclosure, an
agency would be entitled to policy deference on the information foundation underlying
its decision.
293
Under such a model, the DQA could parallel a trend that is occurring in an
increasing number of cases, in both the state and federal court systems, that now require
"the presence of some sort of studies with statistically significant findings before
allowing medical causation evidence and/or testimony to go to the jury. ' 294  The
requirement of underlying statistics before admitting a scientific methodology will,
perhaps unfairly, classify novel or emergent science as junk science. Even though a
potential plaintiff could get a cutting-edge, non-conventional diagnosis from his
physician, said diagnosis would be inadmissible in a court of law.
This trend is yet another similarity between Daubert and the DQA's requirements.
If one of the public policies behind the DQA is indeed transparency, industry will no
doubt argue that an agency should refrain from engaging in a rulemaking or other
activity until it can justify its actions with substantial and complete underlying
information. While it is too early to tell for sure if the DQA will mirror Daubert's
restrictive application, it appears at least possible that the DQA could have a chilling
effect on agency actions that are based on emergent science or not fully proven science.
289. Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, "Gatekeeping" Agency Reliance on Scientific and Technical
Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process, 17 TOuRO L.
REv. 297, 305-06 (2000). The federal government has also evidenced a willingness to further this trend. For
instance, the Science, Technology, and Law program of the National Academies of Science was created
because the "[Supreme] Court's Daubert decision has had ramifications across the entire field of civil
litigation, in criminal litigation, and obviously in the regulatory arena." NAS WORKSHOP #1, supra note 217,
at 3.
290. See Miller & Rein, supra note 289, at 315 (stating that Daubert principles of relevance and reliability
are "clearly compatible" with APA standards of review). In addition, the DQA would seemingly not violate
the "principle of deference to administrative interpretation" laid out in the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal
decision, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id. at 318. The
Chevron holding limits such deference only to legal interpretations reflecting policy or political judgments
and not to strictly information concerns. Id. at 318-19.
291. Elliott et al., supra note 13, at 10129 (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 10130.
293. Id.
294. GulDoTri & ROSE, supra note 284, at 89 (citing Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 570
(Fla. App. 1998); Kelly v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Tex. 1997), dismissed by
Kelly v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 139 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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One of the open questions involving the DQA is the degree to which reviewing
courts will intervene in DQA challenges. The DQA does not specifically address the
issue, which has been subject to considerable debate among legal scholars. 295 Some
contend that the DQA embodies a "win at the agency" strategy that presupposes
extensive DQA litigation.296 Such a strategy would include submitting an RFC to the
agency that identifies a claimed deficiency and a statement of requested agency action
that would correct the problem.
297
It seems more likely, however, that the courts will likely get involved in DQA
challenges and denials. To fully achieve its purported potential as a "good government"
statute, the DQA may require judicial enforcement. 29 8 Typically, the availability of
judicial review for DQA RFCs will be for the courts, not the agencies, to decide. 299 In
addition, there is a strong presumption under the APA in favor of judicial review.300 As
one commentator suggests, "[c]ourts have engaged in judicial oversight of other good-
government statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act because they seek to
change entrenched bureaucratic behavior .... Courts decide for themselves what the
statutory plan requires them to do."'301 In addition, by promulgating a scientific report
or a guidance document on its web site, an agency has arguably engaged in "final"
agency action, which could trigger general review provisions under the APA.
30 2
To date, there have been only a handful of lawsuits filed over DQA concerns. On
August 6, 2003, the Competitive Enterprise Institute ("CEI"), a free-market advocacy
group, filed suit in federal court,3 0 3 alleging that the White House Office of Science and
295. See Shapiro, supra note 223, at 14-15 (contending that the issues involving eventual DQA court
action include standing and ripeness and other procedural issues, as well as whether Congress intended to
preclude judicial review and whether the dissemination of information is a "final" agency action, the
prerequisite for review under the APA); NAS WORKSHOP #1, supra note 217, at 73 (arguing that Congress
could have intended to preclude judicial review under the DQA, except in cases of a clear abuse of discretion,
and that courts will not likely step in to adjudicate the right and wrong of controversial, non-settled science);
id. at 115 (arguing that because the DQA creates mandatory duties, it "imposes procedures that are the kind
that courts historically have policed").
296. Noe et al., supra note 6, at 10230 (reporting the comments of Jim Tozzi, who suggested that a "win
in court" approach would clog the system).
297. Id. at 10231.
298. Id. at 10228 (arguing that courts tend to review typical good government statutes, like the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and NEPA, and that a strong judicial presumption
of the availability of judicial review exists in the absence of a congressional indication of a preclusion of
judicial review); NAS WORKSHOP #1, supra note 217, at 22-23 (arguing that "it will probably take a few
critical court decisions before we know how this law and the associated guideline will be interpreted by
judges").
299. Conrad, supra note 8, at 539.
300. Id. (arguing "that the fundamental purpose of enacting the [DQA] was to establish statutorily an
administrative decision-making process precisely so that affected persons would have some final agency
action from which to appeal").
301. Shapiro, supra note 223, at 15.
302. Id. (stating that final agency actions occur when "rights or obligations have been determined" from
which "legal obligations will flow," or when "an agency's failure to correct information has some
independent impact on public policy or private sector decisions, i.e. has some 'real-world' impact"); see also
O'Reilly, supra note 95, at 841 (arguing that although judicial review is not expressly provided under the
DQA, it is likely to be inferred, once the challenger has exhausted the DQA's administrative remedies).
Incidentally, simply securing judicial review under the APA does not guarantee success. Rather, courts
typically grant broad discretion over agencies' choices of procedures and decline to impose significant
constitutional and statutory constraints on these decisions. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 473.
303. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Bush, D.D.C. No. 03-1670, Aug. 6, 2003.
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Technology Policy violated DQA standards when it distributed a report on climate
change to President Bush and the Congress. 304  In January 2002, CEI allegedly
requested that the White House Science Office cease dissemination of Climate Change
Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and
Change, because the document allegedly "removed information that would let readers
know the uncertainty with which it characterized certain historical climate
information."
' 30 5
The White House Science Office rejected CEI's petition in 2003, and failed to
respond to CEI's subsequent appeal. 306 CEI argued that failure to respond constituted a
rejection of its appeal, and said rejection amounted to final agency action.307  In
November 2003, CEI dropped its DQA lawsuit, after the White House publicly
acknowledged that the document had not been subjected to DQA guidelines.
30
8
On December 9, 2003, the Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
("PEER") filed suit against the United States Army Corps of Engineers, alleging that
the Corps failed to respond to a DQA RFC. 3 09 Filed in the United States District Court
of the District of Columbia, PEER's lawsuit contends that information contained in a
monthly status report on the Mississippi River failed to comply with DQA standards for
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information.3 10 In addition, the U.S. Chamber and
the Salt Institute recently filed a lawsuit claiming that the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services violated the DQA by withholding information from a federally
funded study about the blood pressure effects of dietary salt.3 11 As of submission of
this dissertation, these cases remains active.
VII. SURVEY OF DQA CHALLENGES TO EPA
Now that over two years have passed since its enactment, a cursory review of the
DQA's impact on federal agencies is appropriate. This section focuses on the DQA's
impact on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and how the EPA has
handled DQA challenges. As a threshold concern, it should be noted that the EPA, like
OMB and OIRA, has entered the regulatory reform arena, embracing principles of
economic analysis of law. EPA Administrator Mike Leavitt's approach to
environmental protection is encapsulated in the "Enlibra Principles," which he co-
authored with former Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber. One of the principles, entitled
"Recognition of Benefits and Costs," contends that "[e]nvironmental decisions should
304. Phibbs, supra note 222, at A-5.
305. Id. (stating that removal of the information in question created "an unsupportable and inaccurate
portrayal of data recreating past climate").
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Darren Samuelsohn, CEI, White House Resolve Suit with New Disclaimer Over Data Quality,
GREENWIRE, November 7, 2003, available at http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/searcharchive/testsearch-
display.cgi?q=samuelsohn&file=%2FGreenwire%2Fsearcharchive%2FNewsline%2F2003%2FNov7%2F 110
70307.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
309. Second Lawsuit Filed Under the DQA, OMB Watch, Dec. 15, 2003 (on file with author).
310. Id.
311. Pat Phibbs, Chamber, Institute File Data Quality Suit Seeking Release of Salt Study Information,
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS DAILY ENv'T REPORT, Apr. 1,2004, at A-41.
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be guided by an assessment of the true costs and true benefits of different options,
including life-cycle costs .... Options should consider all social, legal, economic, and
political factors, while ensuring that neither quantitative nor qualitative factors
dominate."312
In October 2002, the EPA published its Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing
the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA Guidelines"). 3 13 As required by the OMB,
the EPA's Guidelines contain the Agency's policy and procedural guidance for ensuring
information quality, outline the administrative mechanisms for pre-dissemination
review of information products, and enable affected persons to seek and obtain
corrections of information that allegedly does not comport with DQA standards.
3 14
The EPA's Guidelines closely track those put out by the OMB. Both include goals
that "[d]isseminated information should adhere to a basic standard of quality, including
objectivity, utility, and integrity ... [and] [a]dministrative mechanisms for correction
should be flexible, [and] appropriate to the nature and timeliness of the disseminated
information." 315 The EPA employs the OMB's definitions for many of the DQA's key
words and phrases, including "quality, objectivity, integrity, and utility,
' 3 16
"information, ' 3 17 and "influential information. ' 318 In addition, the EPA's Guidelines
survey the Agency's existing information management systems.
3 19
The EPA's Guidelines also specify the administrative mechanisms by which an
affected person or party may request a correction of allegedly erroneous information.
320
The EPA expressly lists the information that should be included in a request for
correction,32 1 endeavors to respond to such requests within 90 days, 322 and asserts that
312. Environmental Protection Agency, Mike Leavitt on Environmental Stewardship, available at
http://www.epa.gov/adminweb/1eavitt/enlibra.htm (last visited on Apr. 7, 2005). The EPA also recently
formed a work group to address problematic issues inherent in cost-benefit analysis-namely, that certain
risks pose difficulties for economists to place a value on the benefits on their reduction or eradication. The
Agency recently announced the preliminary results from a case study that involved a work group that brought
risk and economic analysts together with the goal of developing risk assessment in a way that made it easier
for economists to place dollar values on the benefits of reducing exposure to chemicals and pollutants. See
Pat Phibbs, Policies, Guidance on Many Scientific Issues Under Development, EPA Staff Tell Advisers,
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS DAILY ENV'T REPORT, Dec. 15, 2003, at A-I 0.
313. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity,
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency (October 15,
2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/2002/October/Day-15/g 26176.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter "EPA Guidelines"].
314. EPA Guidelines § 1.
315. Id.; 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458-59 (Feb. 22, 2002).
316. EPA Guidelines § 5.1; 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459.
317. EPA Guidelines § 5.3; 67 Fed. Reg. at 8460.
318. EPA Guidelines § 5.3; 67 Fed. Reg. at 8455.
319. EPA Guidelines §§ 4-4.9 (listing these systems to include: a quality system, a peer review policy, an
action development process, an integrated error correction process, an information resources management
manual, a risk characterization policy and handbook, and program-specific policies).
320. Id. § 8 et seq.
321. EPA Guidelines § 8.2 (listing the following information as being necessary for a request for
correction: name and contact information for the individual or organization submitting a complaint; a
description of the information the person believes does not comply with EPA or OMB Guidelines, including
specific citations to the information and to applicable sections of the EPA or OMB Guidelines; an explanation
of how the information does not comply with EPA or OMB Guidelines; recommendations of corrective
action; and an explanation of how the alleged error affects or how a correction would benefit the requestor).
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it will determine the appropriate corrective action. 323 To help ensure transparency of its
information quality process, the EPA has launched a web site to enable the public to
view all DQA petitions, the EPA's acknowledgement and response letters, and other
DQA-related correspondence.
324
Prior to October 1, 2002, the date on which the DQA requirements went into effect,
much scholarly controversy centered on whether the DQA would have any practical
impact on agency function. For instance, agencies will universally assert that they have
data quality and error-correction procedures in place that pre-date the DQA's
enactment. For example, over an eighteen-month period prior to the DQA, the EPA
contends that it received 1,000 notifications and submissions that have come in via the
agency's error correction notification process.325 The EPA determined that 300 of these
were valid, resulting in 120 that required data being corrected.
326
In practice, challenges under the DQA are not playing out in the rulemaking
context, as was predicted by many scholarly pundits and legal commentators. Instead,
industry is using the DQA in Requests for Corrections ("RFCs") and to counter other
informal administrative processes. Between enactment of the DQA and October 2003,
the EPA received 13 RFCs and two petitions for reconsideration. 327 As of publication
of this article, the EPA has not granted a single RFC. The EPA has instead come up
with novel ways of dismissing these claims. The EPA has determined that several of
the requests do not fall under the DQA for procedural reasons. On several instances,
the EPA has asserted that it is not the appropriate agency to consider requests for.. 328
correction. The EPA has also asserted that RFCs under the DQA are inappropriate
where other administrative actions could conceivably remedy the alleged problem.
329
The EPA has based several decisions on whether a dissemination of information
was implicated. For example, the EPA deemed a DQA request incomplete because it
failed to include a reference to a specific piece of information by the EPA. 330 In
addition, the EPA's Office of Air and Radiation challenged two EPA documents,
322. Id. § 8.4.
323. Id. (stating that for appropriate corrective action, the Agency will consider, among other things, the
nature and timeliness of the information involved and the significance of the error on the use of the
information and the magnitude of the error).
324. See Environmental Protectection Agency, EPA's Information Quality Guidelines (IQG), at
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/ (last visited on Mar. 31, 2005).
325. NAS WORKSHOP ll, supra note 217, at 151.
326. Id.
327. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INFORMATION QUALITY FY03 ANNUAL REPORT, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/
informationguidelines/documents/EPAIQGFY03_AnnualReport.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter "EPA INFORMATION QUALITY REPORT"]. As of publication of the report, EPA had yet to
respond to two of the requests for correction.
328. Id. § 3.7 (reporting that EPA is "not the appropriate agency to consider requests for correction
relative to Climate Action Report 2002," and that request from the Competitive Enterprise Institute was
forwarded to the State Department).
329. Id. § 3.4 (contending that a DQA request concerning an EPA assertion about the endocrine effects of
atrazine on frogs would be treated as a comment in the notice and comment period for the Environmental Risk
Assessment for atrazine); Id. § 3.14 (Letter from Susan B. Hazen, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator,
U.S. EPA, to Dino Privetera, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (Nov. 24, 2003) (reporting that EPA intended to
update and revise the guidance for preventing asbestos disease among auto mechanics, and that the
petitioner's DQA complaints would be considered in the aforementioned notice and comment period)).
330. Id. § 3.12 (involving a request that EPA adopt a uniform advisory level for percholate).
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alleging that there were format problems due to conversion issues between versions of
WordPerfect software. 33 1 The EPA decided that the DQA did not apply, as the request
centered on formatting concerns and not a dissemination of information. 332  In
December 2002, the United States Chamber of Commerce submitted a DQA request,
alleging that the minutes of a Scientific Advisory Board meeting were inaccurate.
333
The EPA claimed that documents, like the minutes, generated under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act were not considered information dissemination under the
DQA.33 4 And in a challenge regarding the carcinogenicity of percholate, the EPA ruled
that meetings with EPA officials were "general meetings" and "there were no official
statements regarding the Agency's position on percolate and any potential impacts on
human health.., we would consider such discussions to be informal communications
that the EPA did not disseminate to the public beyond their original context."
335
Simple disagreements with agency policy decisions have not persuaded the EPA to
take corrective action, either. In a response to an RFC submitted by BMW
Manufacturing Corporation ("BMW"), the EPA essentially stood by its decision to list
BMW as being in significant non-compliance with the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.336  The EPA implies that BMW's RFC failed to satisfy DQA
requirements because it involved a disagreement with the EPA's decision or actions and
did not demonstrate a problem with data quality.
337
Finally, any impact the DQA has effected on agency action has been marginal at
best. In October 2002, the Chemical Products Corporation ("CPC") challenged
information concerning the reference dose for barium in the EPA's integrated risk
information system ("IRIS").338  The EPA briefly and tersely responded that the
"petitioner offered an alternative assessment of the relevant science but failed to
demonstrate that the EPA's assessment is not consistent with EPA Guidelines regarding
objectivity and reproducibility." 339  In March 2003, CPC submitted a petition for
reconsideration of the EPA's decision. 34  Because it considered the information in
CPC's petition to be "substantially different" from the initial RFC, the EPA treated the
petition as an original RFC. In light of CPC's second RFC, the EPA has stated that the
toxicological review and IRIS summary for barium will be revised to include a more
explicit and transparent analysis of data.34 1 According to the EPA, "[i]f the expanded
analysis does not support the statement currently contained for barium, EPA will
reassess the IRIS barium and compounds substance file."
342
331. Id. § 3.0.
332. Id.
333. Letter from William L. Kovacs, Vice President, Chamber of Commerce, to United States
Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/
informationguidelines/documents/4301 .pdf (last viewed Mar. 31, 2005).
334. EPA INFORMATION QUALITY REPORT § 3.5.
335. Id. § 3.9.
336. Id. § 3.6.
337. See BMW Challenges Compliance Listings, OMB Watch May 21, 2003, available at
www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/1536-1/252 (last viewed Mar. 31, 2005).
338. EPA INFORMATION QUALITY REPORT § 3.3.
339. Id.
340. Id. § 3.10.
341. Id.
342. Id. EPA also plans to conduct an external peer review of the revision, and anticipates completion by
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CPC's request for correction and subsequent petition for reconsideration may
forecast the DQA's potential impact. Far from bringing a tidal wave of litigation,
flooding the courts, and shutting down agency action, the DQA will operate on a more
microscopic level. Affected individuals will be able to challenge the data and
information that underlies agency action, but they will have a tough road to hoe.
Industry will possess yet another weapon by which to challenge an agency, but the
weapon will work more like a tranquilizer than a nuclear bomb. The rare DQA victory
will comprise of an agency begrudgingly conceding a minor point or piece of
information. 343 Far from a titanic shift in the process of agency action and conduct,
these subtle victories will be the hallmark of life in the DQA age. And in keeping with
so many of its predecessors in the economic analysis of law movement, the DQA will
have a marginal impact in achieving its stated goal: that of improving information
quality and administrative transparency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the initial years since its enactment, the Data Quality Act has proved to be an
intriguing new development of administrative law. It is the latest in a long string of
federal statutory authority and legislation that addresses elements of economic analysis
of law. The DQA purports to guarantee the quality, objectivity, integrity, and accuracy
of the data that underlies the information that the federal government disseminates to
the general public. It has not created a firestorm of litigation or completely bogged
down the federal government. It does, however, stand as a significant signpost in the
economic analysis of law movement-a movement that relies on the accuracy and
transparency of information to render cost-benefit analyses of agency action.
While the DQA is an important step in the economic analysis of law movement, it
is certainly not the final one. Transparency in the federal administrative system
continues to remain a hot plate issue for Congress. In September 2003, the OMB
requested public comments on a proposal to issue new guidance to "realize the benefits
of meaningful peer review of the most important science disseminated by the Federal
Government regarding regulatory topics." 344 The OMB's proposal also would require
each agency that receives a non-frivolous DQA Request for Correction to promptly post
the challenge on its website or forward a copy to the OIRA. 34 5 In October 2003, the
June 2004. See Data Quality Challenge on Barium, OMB Watch, Dec. 23, 2002, available at
www.ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/1 231/-1/158/ (last viewed Mar. 31, 2005).
343. In the Chamber's RFC over atrazine, while disputing the petitioners' claims that EPA's risk
assessment asserted that atrazine "causes endocrine effects," the Agency made "minor editorial changes" in its
revised assessment to prevent further ambiguity about its position.
344. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 2003).
Under OMB's proposal, federal agencies would have to require peer review of "significant regulatory
information," which is "scientific or technical information that (i) qualifies as 'influential' under OMB's
information quality guidelines and (ii) is relevant to regulatory policies." Id. at 54,026 (articulating that peer
review is necessary for "significant regulatory information" upon which an agency bases its support for a
major regulatory action, or which could have a clear and substantial impact on import public policies or
private sector decisions with a possible impact of$100 million in any year).
345. Id. (stating that the posting and reporting requirement will assist OMB in discharging its DQA
requirement of monitoring the quality of publicly disseminated information).
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Geneal ccontin Ofice("GA ") " 346General Accounting ffice ("GAO") issued a report concluding that the OIRA, while
more open than under previous administrations, continues to struggle to comply with
the executive orders signed by Presidents Reagan and Clinton.
347
Finally, Congress has recently delivered the following statement to the OIRA:
"Agencies are shielding significant, influential data and related documents ... from the
requirements of the Federal Data Quality Act.'348 Congress has directed the OIRA to
submit a report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on how
information quality guidelines to agencies may be updated to improve the transparency
of agency science.349  Only the passage of time will tell whether an amendment is
needed to spur faster and more effective DQA compliance from federal agencies, or
whether the DQA's two paragraphs, standing alone, rectify a glaring absence of the
APA, and adequately address data quality concerns.
346. RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF
THOSE REVIEWS, GAO-03-929 (Oct. 2003).
347. Coyne, supra note 91. The GAO report suggested that the OIRA has persuaded the EPA and other
federal agencies to make major changes to rules in the early stages of drafting rules. According to the report,
14 of 17 rules submitted by the EPA to the OIRA were significantly changed at the OIRA's suggestion, and
another proposed rule was returned to the EPA. Id. In response to the GAO report, Senators Dick Durbin and
Joe Lieberman requested that the White House disclose more information about the process by which federal
agencies change major rules based on input and revisions from the executive branch. See Press Release,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Lieberman, Durbin Press OIRA on Openness, Accountability
(Nov. 7, 2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases
.Detail&PressReleaseid=563&Affiliation=R (last visited Apr. 8, 2005) (alleging inadequate disclosure of
information about the OIRA's communications with outside parties, a failure to disclose e-mail, faxes, and
documents exchanged between agency regulators and the OIRA staff, and the lack of explanation for why a
rule is withdrawn from review).
348. S. REP. NO. 108-146 (2004).
349. Id.
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